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THE ILLINOIS JUDICIARY
AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR DISPUTES:
A RETURN TO AN IMPERIAL JUDICIARY?
GILBERT FELDMAN*
I thought this was supposed to be a free country? I thought
men had a right to stop work when they didn't find conditions
satisfactory? If their own elected government tells them it's illegal
to strike, that they must work under any terms the employers see
fit to grant them or go to jail, then they're not better than slaves. If
this is really a democracy we live under, that injunction is illegal.'
The failure of the Illinois legislature to enact a public employee collec-
tive bargaining law2 is generally regarded as the fundamental cause of the
current unsatisfactory status of labor relations in public employment. 3 While
there certainly is an urgent need for comprehensive legislation, the Illinois
judiciary is at least equally responsible for the mess in public employment
relations. Although the courts have proclaimed themselves reluctant partici-
pants in this arena, acting only to fill a legislative vacuum, they have
nevertheless shaped public employee labor policy to fit their own social,
political and economic views, regardless of existing legal doctrines and
precedents, expressions of legislative and executive intent, and equitable
maxims applied by high courts in other states.
The battle waged before the Illinois judiciary has related to two basic
questions: (1) the right of public employees to better themselves through
* Partner, Cornfield & Feldman; J.D., Northwestern University.
1. I. STONE, CLARENCE DARROW FOR THE DEFENSE 3 (1941). From a conversation recon-
structed by the author in which Darrow, in 1894, is advising Marvin Hughitt, President of the
Chicago & North Western Railway, of Darrow's decision to resign from his position as counsel
for the railway and to join forces with Eugene Debs and his American Railway Union in their
strike against the Pullman Company and the affected railways.
2. On June 9, 1975, State Senator Richard M. Daley (Dem., Chicago) successfully moved
to send the pending public employee collective bargaining bills to subcommittee for an ig-
nominious burial. Previously, the Democrats had piously supported bills certain to be defeated
by the Republican majorities which customarily control the two houses of the General Assem-
bly. With the Democrats in firm charge of both chambers, however, a change of direction on
their part was called for and they proved equal to the task. Chicago Sun-Times, June 10, 1975,
at 24, col. 3. It has been suggested that the legislative impasse reflects a stalemate over the
question of whether an act should contain a no-strike provision. Note, The Illinois Anti-
Injunction Act is Not Applicable to Strikes by Public Sector Employees and Such Strikes are
Illegal Per Se, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 187, 190-91 [hereinafter cited as The Illinois Anti-Injunction
Act].
3. Clark, Public Employee Labor Legislation: A Study of the Unsuccessful Attempt to
Enact a Public Employee Bargaining Statute in Illinois, 20 LAB. L.J. 164, 173 (1969). See
Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943 (1969);
Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885 (1973).
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self-help, including the right to strike; and (2) the enforceability of public
employee collective bargaining agreements. In the public sector, Illinois
courts have both illegalized self-help and refused to enforce contracts.
Public employee unions in Illinois are now in a pubescent period similar to
that earlier experienced by private sector unions, and the role played by the
Illinois judiciary over the past decade produces a sense of deja vu.
American courts previously wrestled with the first issue, the right to
strike, for more than a century in private sector labor cases, leaving behind a
grotesque and ultimately discredited history. By ignoring common law
limitations on judicial power, casually discarding legislation as unconstitu-
tional, or interpreting it contrary to the intent of the framers, American
courts became political institutions. They created unprecedented principles
so vague as to permit individual judges to decide disputes according to their
political or socio-economic philosophy. By and large, the judiciary served
as the plenipotentiary of private industry. Long after private sector unions
won to their side the executive and legislative branches of government, the
judiciary remained their "political" adversary.
The second issue currently confronting public employee unions, enfor-
ceability of their contracts, lacks a clear counterpart in private sector judicial
experience. This is because private sector unions waged and won their battle
with the judiciary with respect to the right to strike before the more
sophisticated issue of contract enforcement became legally significant. By
the time Congress enacted comprehensive legislation which clearly estab-
lished a policy of enforcing private sector collective bargaining agreements,
the federal courts were no longer hostile to private sector unions and
therefore interpreted and applied the Congressional policy according to its
intent and terms.
The purpose of this article is to compare the evolving public sector
Illinois labor cases with their earlier counterparts in the private sector. This
comparison will demonstrate the marked similarity in underlying political
and socio-economic philosophy which served as the cornerstone of the
judicial decisions in both sectors. That philosophy essentially espouses the
subordination of worker interests to those of their private or public employ-
ers. It is a philosophy which has been cloaked with judicial respectability
and the force of law by the use of contrived and hollow legalisms. This
comparison also will demonstrate the need for legislation which realistically
and effectively addresses the problems which have arisen in the public
sector.
THE PRIVATE SECTOR
A number of doctrines were developed successively in private sector
cases, all calculated to serve the interests of private employers against their
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employees. This trend continued until a change in the political climate of the
nation ultimately caused a reversal and the triumph of the formerly minority
views of Justices Holmes and Brandeis.
The Criminal Conspiracy Doctrine
In the first reported American labor case, the Philadelphia Cordwain-
ers Case,4 the English doctrine of criminal conspiracy was manipulated to
illegalize conduct on the part of American workers that was legitimate in
other contexts. There the organized Philadelphia shoemakers demanded a
raise in wages. The city's businessmen foresaw that such concerted employ-
ee action could jeopardize the competitive position of Philadelphia shoe
dealers bidding against unorganized dealers in other eastern cities for
wholesale contracts with merchants in new cities in the expanding young
country.
Public authority reflected the view of the Philadelphia property owners
and businessmen, since they alone were eligible to vote. Hence, an indict-
ment was obtained from the prosecutor and a criminal conspiracy conviction
from the judge, Recorder Levy. He found that the shoemakers were illegally
affecting wages and prices by "artificial regulation," and that a strike to
raise wages was an "unnatural means" of raising the price of work above
the "natural" level determined by competition between workers for avail-
able employment. 5 Following the Philadelphia Cordwainers Case, the
criminal conspiracy doctrine became an accepted tool to deny workers the
right to engage in self-help activities.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, economic condi-
tions in the New England states had changed with the introduction of new
industries. The business community desired to calm the storm which had
resulted from use of the criminal conspiracy doctrine to intimidate and
control workers.
6
4. 3 COMMONS AND GILMORE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
59(1910).
5. For a similar application of the criminal conspiracy doctrine to enforce these prevail-
ing economic views, see People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835). Strikers, seeking to
protect their wage standards, were convicted under a vague statute which made criminal a
conspiracy to commit an act "injurious to trade or commerce." The underlying premise for
proscribing concerted action by workers was the need to make workers compete against one
another for jobs to assure that businesses would remain competitive. Yet, 15 years following
the Philadelphia Cordwainers Case, a Pennsylvania court found no criminal conspiracy to exist
when the shoe manufacturers acted concertedly to depress the wages of their respective
employees. Such action was found to be a "natural" combination of the employers as contrast-
ed to the "unnatural" combination by the workers. Thus the "sauce for the goose" theory was
found to be hollow. Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightly's Rep. 36 (Pa 1821), as reported in E.
Oakes, THE LAW OF ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS 209 (1927).
6. Organized workers in New England had virtually declared war on the courts. They
rejected being labeled as criminals for pursuing their economic self-interest. New England was
witnessing mock trials and hanging of judges in effigy. The press was highly critical of the
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Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, a well-known partisan of indus-
try, disposed of the outmoded criminal conspiracy doctrine in a case involv-
ing a bootmakers' strike to force an employer to discharge a non-union
journeyman. In Commonwealth v. Hunt,7 the conspiracy conviction was
reversed on appeal in one of the most brilliant tongue-in-cheek opinions in
American jurisprudence. Shaw found the indictment defective for failure to
allege an illegal purpose, an allegation needed to prove a criminal conspira-
cy. Obviously, he said, employees could not strike for the purpose of
requiring all workers to join their union in order to control the wage
structure. He suggested, however, that as far as could be discerned from the
indictment (although the evidence at trial clearly established otherwise),
these workers might have struck for perfectly laudable purposes; for exam-
ple, attempting to rid their shop of imbibers. How, asked Shaw, could an
indictment leaving open this possibility be sufficient to allege an unlawful
purpose?
This decision sounded the death knell for the criminal conspiracy
doctrine in American labor cases. Shaw's message was not, of course, that
prosecutors should draw clearer indictments. It was that industrial strife
endangering the interests of the prevailing socio-economic class, rather than
sound legal reasoning, led courts to reverse their anti-labor positions. The
message was not lost on American workers.
The Illegal Purpose Doctrine
Despite the abandonment of the criminal conspiracy doctrine, a similar
theory, the illegal purpose doctrine, continued to be employed to restrict
labor unions in civil tort suits arising from concerted action by workers for
their economic betterment. This doctrine defied definition. Standards were
totally lacking and little or no consistency was apparent in the reasoning of
the judges. The conduct declared illegal was neither criminal nor tortious
under common law. It entailed acts that were indisputably legitimate if
committed by an individual, but which could be declared tortious if done
collectively by workers. In actuality, this doctrine reflected the understand-
ing of the anti-labor establishment that collective, as opposed to individual,
action afforded workers a realistic opportunity to advance their self-interest.
In the absence of controlling legislation, the illegal purpose doctrine
was thrashed out in state courts during the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. The doctrine was enunciated by the Massachusetts Supreme
courts. Juries were defying the courts by their refusal to convict regardless of clear evidence of
violations of the law as interpreted by the courts. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE,
THE LABOR INJUNCTION 17 n.71 (1930) [hereinafter cited as FRANKFURTER & GREENE].
7. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
8. Id. at 130.
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Court majority, although that doctrine was not universally accepted. Some
courts chose to follow the dissenting view of Mr. Justice Holmes, sitting on
the Massachusetts court, while others preferred the more liberal view of the
New York courts.
With the fall of the criminal conspiracy doctrine, many American
courts came to concede the legitimacy of employees engaging in direct
collective action against their employers, including strikes, for improved
wages and working conditions.9 However, the Massachusetts majority,
enunciating the illegal purpose doctrine, refused to extend to organized
workers the right to protect their wages and work standards by using indirect
action, such as economic coercion against unorganized workers and em-
ployers who could undercut their economic position.' 0 The court attempted
to draw an analogy between business enterprises and workers, an analogy
which still reflected the view of Recorder Levy. Under our free trade
competitive system, businesses compete against one another for customers;
hence, the court reasoned, workers should be required to compete against
one another for work." To the Massachusetts court, expansion of unionism
spelled monopoly and had to be curtailed. This conservative judicial view
prevailed until the 1920's and the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
12
Mr. Justice Holmes was the first American jurist to take issue with the
Massachusetts doctrine. Starting with the premise that "free competition
means combination" Holmes stated:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his
services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital,
to get his services for the least possible return. Combination on
the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is
the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be
carried on in a fair and equal way. 3
In a string of dissenting opinions, Holmes disapproved of courts deter-
mining what constituted justifiable competitive acts, declaring that such
9. E.g., Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 94 N.E. 316 (1911).
10. Thus, the illegal purpose doctrine was applied when a union sought to protect its work
against sub-contracting, Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1 (1870); to protect its work against
scab labor, Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (18%); to boycott employers in
the industry of its trade who employed cheap labor, Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E.
1011 (1900); and to attempt to enforce a closed shop, Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E.
603 (1905).
II. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906). Although the Massachusetts
court based its distinctions in labor cases upon the free trade analogy, it had failed to apply this
test earlier to a business combination which had eliminated its competition and monopolized its
industry by boycotting customers who dealt with a target company. Bowen v. Matheson, 96
Mass. (14 Allen) 499 (1867).
12. See text accompanying notes 46-53 infra.
13. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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decisions are matters of public policy.' 4 He rejected the majority's distinc-
tion between concerted action by workers for organizational purposes and
concerted action for higher wages, explaining that one was necessary to
achieve the other.' 5 Under free enterprise, Holmes reasoned, workers were
justified in causing harm to others in pursuit of their own selfish economic
ends' 6 so long as the motivation was not purely malicious.'
7
Going one step beyond Holmes, the New York doctrine held that so
long as the conduct of workers was not illegal under traditional common law
standards, their motives were irrelevant. 18 Years later, after the New York
doctrine had been generally accepted, Mr. Justice Andrews of the New York
Court of Appeals explicitly discarded the cornerstone of the Massachusetts
majority view, the distinction between direct and indirect action. He recog-
nized that "[e]conomic organization to-day is not based on the single shop.
Unions believe that wages may be increased, collective bargaining main-
tained only if union conditions prevail, not in some single factory, but
generally."' 9 Like Holmes before him, Justice Andrews found the unions'
determination as how best to serve their self-interest "sufficient to justify
the harm . . ." that may result from union organizational efforts and
boycotts.20
Such legal reasoning, however, was not the primary cause of the
eclipse of the illegal purpose doctrine in civil tort cases. Like its predeces-
sor, the criminal conspiracy doctrine, the illegal purpose theory proved
impractical to assist employers in combatting and controlling union organi-
zation. 2' Therefore, in the late nineteenth century, employers sought yet
14. E.g., id. at 106, 44 N.E. at 1080; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011,
1016 (1900).
15. The immediate object and motive was to strengthen the defendants' society as a
preliminary and [sic] means to enable it to make a better fight on the questions of
wages or other matters of clashing interests . . . . I think that unity of organization is
necessary to make the contest of labor effectual, and that societies of laborers
lawfully may employ in their preparation the means which they might use in the final
contest.
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 505, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (1900) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
16. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108-09, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081-82 (1896).
17. Holmes' narrow exception was probably intended to preserve only the "spiteful
harm" tort doctrine. See, e.g., Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888).
18. See, e.g., National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369,
130 N.Y.S. 1073 (1902).
19. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 263, 157 N.E. 130, 132
(1927).
20. Id.
21. Litigation generally was protracted beyond the duration of the strike, boycott or
picketing which the employer desired to eliminate. Juries, sympathetic with workers, often
refused to find for plaintiff employers, or returned only nominal money verdicts, and money
judgments proved ineffectual against poorly-paid employees and financially-strapped unions.
For these and other reasons, strikes, boycotts and picketing were not curbed. See generally R.
SMITH, LABOR LAW 2-20 (1950); FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 6, at 17-24.
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another legal instrument, one which might achieve what had not been
accomplished by the earlier doctrines.
The Labor Injunction
The labor injunction proved more than adequate to the task of assisting
employers in inhibiting union expansion. 22 By reinterpreting prerequisites
previously regarded as essential to the issuance of an injunction, 23 American
judges transformed an extraordinary remedy into a virtually automatic one.
Through this new judicial tool, employers simply procured from chancellors
orders prohibiting strikes and quickly caused workers to be jailed for
contempt should any threat of union activity survive the issuance of the
injunctive order. 24 In ironic contrast to the "political" posture of jurists on
behalf of employers, the two properly political branches of government, the
executive and the legislative, as well as both political parties, sided with
labor in deploring judicial use of the labor injunction.25
22. It was born innocuously enough. Chancellors were appointing receivers to operate
insolvent railroads; when the employees of one such railroad threatened to strike for higher
wages, the receiver complained to the chancellor that the property entrusted to his management
was endangered by the strike threat. The chancellor immediately put the union leaders in jail for
contempt of court. Within hours, the workers' concerted action was dissipated. By 1890, the
labor injunction was thoroughly entrenched. A full treatment of this turn in American law is
brillantly and exhaustively documented in FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 6.
23. Injunctions historically were restricted to the preservation of tangible "property."
However, American courts held that an intangible business interest also was property. The
second prerequisite to the obtaining of injunctive relief was a showing of irreparable harm.
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 6, at 47-48; see generally id. at 47-81.
24. The employer would prepare a vague affidavit alleging that his employees were
striking, picketing, or engaging in other concerted activity, or were about to do so, and that
irreparable harm would result to the employer's business for which he had no adequate legal
remedy. A petition supported by the affidavit would be presented to a judge, seeking an
immediate ex parte temporary restraining order. The orders customarily were issued upon
request during day or night, from the courthouse or the judge's home. Bonds were not required
of the employer. The orders were prepared by the employer's counsel and were usually
extremely vague. Since no one could be sure what or who was being enjoined, the effect was to
deter all union activity, as well as sympathetic activity. Service of papers and giving of notice
tended to be grossly haphazard. Within hours of the issuance of the order, either all union
activity had ceased or contempt proceedings had been initiated and concluded and the union
leaders were in jail. Id. at 66-81.
For the most part, whatever judicially transpired thereafter was of little relevance to the
cause of the workers or the legality of their conduct; the workers' objective had been defeated
with the issuance of the temporary restraining order. In those cases where trials were later held,
the judge who had issued the order customarily would make findings that wrongdoing by the
workers had been imminent even if none had in fact occurred. Evidence in support of such a
finding was not considered indispensable. The finding was considered sufficient to support
conversion of the temporary order into a final injunction. Some judges frankly stated that their
findings and orders were based upon their contempt for the working class. Since the cases were
heard in chancery courts, there was no right to a jury trial. Appeals from the trial courts were
essentially futile because the issue between the parties had long since been determined by the
time an appeal could be heard and decided. See generally id. at 55-76; C. GREGORY, LABOR AND
THE LAw 52-62 (rev. ed. 1949).
25. The Democratic Party in its 1896 platform declared:
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The Clayton Act
American unions responded to the hostile judiciary by mounting a
major campaign to withdraw from both federal and state courts the authority
to issue injunctions in labor disputes. 26 The seemingly successful results at
the federal level were sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act of 1914.27
Section 6 ostensibly barred legal proceedings against unions under the
Sherman Act. 28 Section 20 ostensibly forbade issuance of injunctions in
[W]e especially object to government by injunction as a new and highly dangerous
form of oppression by which Federal Judges, in contempt of the laws of the States
and rights of citizens, become at once legislators, judges and executioners; and we
approve the bill passed by the last session of the United States Senate, and now
pending in the House of Representatives, relative to contempt in Federal courts and
providing for trials by jury in certain cases of contempt.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION 194-95 (1896), quoted in FRANKFURTER &
GREENE, supra note 6, at 19-20 n.79. The Republican Party also pledged correction of abuses
created by the labor injunction at its 1908 convention. See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra
note 6, at 156.
President Theodore Roosevelt asked for corrective action in five successive messages to
Congress: 15 MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 6983 (Dec. 5, 1905); 7026-27 (Dec. 3,
1906); 7086 (Dec. 3, 1907); 7190 (Apr. 27, 1908); 7313 (Dec. 8, 1908). See also 42 CONG. REC.
1347-48 (1908). He stated on December 3, 1906 that "there have undoubtedly been flagrant
wrongs committed by judges in connection with labor disputes even within the last four years."
15 MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7027. He added in his April 27, 1908, message:
"They are blind who fail to realize the extreme bitterness caused among large bodies of worthy
citizens by the use that has been repeatedly made of the power of injunction in labor disputes."
Id. at 7190. President Taft subsequently renewed the call. Inaugural address, March 4, 1909; 16
MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7378. Above history reprinted and discussed in
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 6, at 76-77 and 76 n.116.
Within Congress, from 1894 through 1914, continuous and strenuous attention was being
devoted to the problem of the labor injunction. See discussion of Congressional action leading
to the Clayton Act in the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
369-70, nn.39 & 40 (1921).
26. An evocative incident in this battle is related in FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note
6, at 52-53, n.19. At a Senate hearing on January 6, 1913, Gompers first quoted from the judge
who had tried the highly publicized McNamara brothers case, involving a bombing of the Los
Angeles Times building: "The evidence in this case will convince any impartial person that
government by injunction is infinitely to be preferred to government by dynamite." Gompers
then offered the response: "If ever the time shall come (and let us hope and work that it never
shall come) when government by dynamite shall be attempted it will have as its main cause the
theory and policy upon which is based government by injunction-personal government foisted
upon our people instead of a government by law."
27. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version codified in scattered sections
of 15, 29 U.S.C. (1970)).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970). This antitrust federal enactment had been intended to apply to
combinations of capital; however, the courts saw it as another mechanism with which to strike
at combinations of labor. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911);
Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); see FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 6, at 139 &
n.17.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provided in pertinent part that the antitrust laws were not to be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor organizations or to restrain their
members from "lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organiza-
tions, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws." Ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 781 (1914) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970)).
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labor disputes. 29 Labor leader Samuel Gompers promptly characterized his
apparent victory as "Labor's Magna Carta." 30 He did not take into account
the resourcefulness of labor's antagonists on the United States Supreme
Court.
The new law was interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering3 in a majority opinion by Mr. Justice
Pitney. The Court essentially found that Congress, rather than curbing
judicial activity in labor disputes, actually had codified the very judicial
evils it was attempting to eliminate. Section 6 was handled by the almost
casual observation that "there is nothing in the section to exempt such an
organization or its members from accountability where it or they depart from
its normal and legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade."
3 2
Only slightly more difficult was the convolution of section 20. Finding
that "Congress had in mind particular industrial controversies, not a general
class war . . . ,"" the opinion confined the applicability of the statutory
prohibitions to disputes between an employer and his employees, excluding
from protection third parties attempting to organize the employer. Mr.
Justice Pitney proclaimed that section 20 "is but declaratory of the law as it
stood before." 34 In effect, Pitney revitalized the distinction drawn by the
Massachusetts majority under the old illegal purpose doctrine when civil tort
had been the judicial weapon." Convinced that expansion of union power
through organization was economically and socially undesirable, the Court
was not about to be dissuaded by a Congressional act from its conclusion
that employees of a given employer but not union federations could strike
and picket in support of their bargaining demands.36
29. Ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970)). In pertinent
part, the section provides:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and
employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or be-
tween persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out
of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to
prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the
application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property
or property right must be described with particularity in the application, which must
be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.
30. 21 AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST 971 (1914).
31. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
32. Id. at 469.
33. Id. at 472.
34. Id. at 470.
35. See generally notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
36. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, offered an analysis which for the first time chal-
lenged the economic underpinning of the Massachusetts doctrine. He asserted that for workers
in an industry to organize was necessary as a matter of self-defense, or else the advanced wages
and working standards of organized labor could not survive. 254 U.S. at 479-80.
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The Yellow Dog Contract
Contemporaneously with its use of the labor injunction as a weapon
against the exercise of union power, American industry employed the
"yellow dog contract" to restrict union membership. Under the yellow dog
contract, employers extracted from their employees, as a condition of hiring
and continued employment, a promise that the employee would not be a
member of a union. The labor movement, however, successfully mobilized
its political resources to obtain federal and state legislation rendering yellow
dog contracts not only illegal, but criminal.37 Once again, industry turned to
the judiciary for assistance. The United States Supreme Court responded
favorably, holding under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution that both the federal 38 and state39 laws were unconstitu-
tional infringements of the right to contract. To the unions' protest that the
legislation merely sought to overcome the unfair bargaining advantage
industry had over the individual employee, the Court responded that in our
economic system the person holding more property would inevitably be
stronger than his adversary.
40
In attacking the yellow dog contract, labor had successfully used its
political power to combat its adversaries' superior economic power at the
conventions of both major political parties as well as with the executive and
legislative branches of government. Now the Court was nullifying labor's
political victory on the explicit ground that industry inherently was entitled
to the advantage and that it was beyond the realm of political authorities to
Brandeis then recapitulated the 20-year history leading to the adoption of the Clayton Act.
With respect to the illegal purpose doctrine he stated:
It was objected that, due largely to environment, the social and economic ideas of
judges, which thus became translated into law, were prejudicial to a position of
equality between workingman and employer; that due to this dependence upon the
individual opinion of judges great confusion existed as to what purposes were lawful
and what unlawful; and that in any event Congress, not the judges, was the body
which should declare what public policy in regard to the industrial struggle demands.
Id. at 485. According to Brandeis, the method agreed upon by the advocates of reform
legislation was for Congress to legalize certain acts "which had previously been held unlawful,
whenever courts had disapproved of the ends for which they were performed; it then declared
that, when these acts were committed in the course of an industrial dispute, they should not be
held to violate any law of the United States." Id. at 486.
Brandeis then focused upon the proper role of the judiciary:
The conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it cannot
continue their struggle without danger to the community. But it is not for judges to
determine whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of
permissible contest and to declare the duties which the new situation demands. This
is the function of the legislature . . ..
Id. at 488.
37. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. §§ 4674-4675 (1909); Erdman Act, ch. 370, § 10, 30 Stat. 424
(1898).
38. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
39. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
40. Id. at 17-18.
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alter the scales. 4' From that time on, unions concluded that it was essential
to achieve sufficient political power, not only to affect executive and
legislative decisions, but to place the "right" people on the bench.42
The conflict was further escalated in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchell. 43 There, the United States Supreme Court upheld a labor injunc-
tion barring the organizing efforts of the United Mine Workers in unor-
ganized coal mines where the miners had been forced to sign yellow dog
contracts as a condition of employment. Mr. Justice Brandeis cried out in
dissent against a runaway judiciary flying in the face of Congressional and
state legislative action that had declared the use of yellow dog contracts a
crime."4
The utter disdain in which organized labor held the United States
Supreme Court reached its apex in reaction to Hitchman. When President
Hoover appointed Judge Parker of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit to fill a Supreme Court vacancy, labor successfully opposed his
nomination on the ground that he had followed the Hitchman precedent in a
subsequent case. The effect was to nullify the Supreme Court decision; any
judge who followed it would be exposed to the wrath of organized labor.
45
The Norris-LaGuardia Act
In the late 1920's, labor marshaled its political power in another
attempt at a legislative cure for its problems with the judiciary. The result
was the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 46
Norris-LaGuardia removed the federal courts from the arena of labor-
management conflict. It made yellow dog contracts unenforceable as a
matter of public policy. 47 By setting forth clear definitions susceptible of but
a single construction,48 and by immunizing from federal court injunction
certain equally well-defined acts involving or growing out of a labor dis-
41. Although he had applied virtually the identical philosophical rationale, even Recorder
Levy in the Philadelphia Cordwainers Case had not gone so far as to nullify clear expressions of
the legislature and executive. See note 4 supra.
42. Eventually, this strategy produced dividends for labor, in the form of President
Roosevelt's 1936 court-packing plan and the upholding of the constitutionality of the National
Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970))the following year. NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See note 59 infra.
43. 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (Brandeis, Holmes, & Clarke, J.J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 263-74.
45. The political sensitivity of organized labor to Supreme Court appointments never
ceased after this successful experience. Forty years later, labor was largely instrumental in
achieving the rejection of President Nixon's successive attempts to appoint federal court of
appeals judges Haynsworth and Carswell.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101- 115 (1970).
47. Id. § 103.
48. Id. § 113.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
pute,49 Congress sought to resist the anticipated judicial attempt to relegate
the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the fate of the Clayton Act.5°
In the lower courts, Old Guard federal judges responded to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act as anticipated. As with the Clayton Act, the same two-
pronged approach was taken. First, section 13, the definition section, was
interpreted in the same manner as section 20 of the Clayton Act was
interpreted in the Deering case. The courts ignored the fact that section 13
had been drafted with that decision in mind and in unmistakably clear
language to avoid that result 1.5 Second, Norris-LaGuardia was held uncon-
stitutional on the theory that Congress lacked the power to prohibit an
injunction against third parties to a labor dispute who were seeking to
organize the industry. 52 The issue was settled on appeal when the majority
on the New Deal Supreme Court interpreted the Norris-LaGuardia Act as it
was written and upheld its constitutionality.
53
After one and a quarter centuries, the American courts were finally out
of the business of "legislating" policy to govern labor disputes in the
private sector. Union organization would be permissible on an industry-
wide basis and fhe means to be employed by the parties, including economic
self-help measures, would be determined by them and not by the courts.
The New Deal Legislation
The New Deal Congress, however, was not satisfied to remain neutral.
A series of pro-labor measures were adopted, which substituted Congres-
sional for judicial determination of what policies would best serve the public
interest in labor-management disputes. An essential feature of this legisla-
tion was the virtual recognition of the right of workers to strike, conditioned
only upon their prior observance of mediation and other procedures de-
signed to resolve the dispute. Provision also was made for dealing with
national emergency strikes.
49. Id. § 104.
50. Use of the unlawful purpose doctrine was prohibited (id. § 105); strict agency princi-
ples were to be adhered to in the attribution of responsibility or liability (id. § 106); injunctive
orders were required to be supported by findings and a bonding requirement was specified (id. §
107); a party seeking injunctive relief was obligated to have utilized all available methods of
resolving the dispute (id. § 108); the scope of the injunction was limited to those specific acts
complained of and enumerated in the findings of fact (id. § 109); provision was made for
expeditious review by the federal court of appeals (id. § 110); the right of jury trial was
established in contempt cases other than direct contempt (id. § Ill); and procedures were
provided to assure an impartial judge in a contempt case (id. § 112).
51. E.g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 92 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1937),
rev'd, 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
52. E.g., Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 82 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1933), aff'd, 90 F.2d 250 (7th
Cir. 1937), rev'd, 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
53. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938); Senn v. Tile
Layers' Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR DISPUTES
The Railway Labor Act 54 provided for separate and disparate treatment
of "major disputes" and "minor disputes." 55 In a major dispute, a party is
permitted to employ self-help measures only after exhaustion of the pre-
scribed statutory mediation procedures. In a minor dispute, the parties are
not permitted to employ self-help measures. 56 Instead, the statute provides
machinery for grievances and binding arbitration.
The Wagner Act of 193557 and the Taft-Hartley amendments of 194758
set forth the Congressional labor policy affecting the largest number of
employees in the private sector. 59 Like the Railway Labor Act, the measures
provide a mechanism to settle labor disputes without strikes or lockouts.
In a major dispute where there is an existing collective bargaining
agreement between the parties which is about to expire, Taft-Hartley pro-
vides certain procedural prerequisites which must be observed prior to strike
or lockout. 6° It further provides for the handling of national emergencies
created by actual or threatened strikes or lockouts in an entire industry or a
substantial part of the industry.61 Unlike the Railway Labor Act, Taft-
Hartley does not absolutely prohibit self-help as a method of resolving
minor disputes. However, binding arbitration is favored.62 The United
States Supreme Court, implementing this Congressional policy, has held
binding arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements judicially
enforceable. 63
54. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164, 181-188 (1970).
55. The term "major dispute" referred to an interest dispute, e.g., a dispute over what
would be the terms of the contract. The term "minor dispute" referred to a contract or rights
dispute, e.g., a dispute over the construction or interpretation of the terms of the contract. Id. §
152, construed in Elgin, Joliet & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-25 (1944).
56. A strike over a minor dispute is enjoinable notwithstanding the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R.R., 353 U.S. 30
(1957).
57. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 378, § 1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
58. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167, 171-
197 (1970).
59. The genesis of the Wagner Act was section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act (the "Blue Eagle") of 1933 (Pub. L. No. 90-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933)) [hereinafter referred to
in the text as NRA], which (1) gave employees the right to organize and bargain collectively
with representatives of their own choosing, free from employer interference; and (2) provided
that no employee, as a condition of employment, could be forced to join or not join a union.
President Franklin Roosevelt, by Executive Order, created the National Labor Board to
enforce the NRA. Significantly, the legislation did not empower the Board to compel com-
pliance with its orders. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held the NRA unconstitutional in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Wagner Act was passed the
same year in response to pressure immediately brought to bear by organized labor. The court-
packing plan followed and the constitutionality of the Wagner Act was upheld by a bare
majority. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
61. Id. § 176.
62. Id. § 173.
63. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In furtherance of the
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The federal labor policy governing minor disputes under Taft-Hartley
was further delineated in a trilogy of steelworkers cases. In United Steel-
workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.6' the Supreme Court
ruled that, should the question be raised, the presumption is in favor of
arbitrability. The Supreme Court further held in United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 65 that the courts were not to
substitute their judgment for that of the arbitrator as to the appropriate
remedy for a contract violation. Finally, in United Steelworkers of America
v. American Manufacturing Co.,66 again emphasizing the limited role
reserved to the courts, the Court reversed a court of appeals' refusal to order
arbitration on the ground that in its opinion the grievance was absolutely
frivolous.
Status of the Law in the Private Sector
After a century and a half of bitter struggle, the federal government had
reached certain conclusions and decisions regarding labor relations in the
private sector: the courts were largely removed as participants in the resolu-
tion of labor disputes; public policy was to be established by Congress, not
by the courts; the right to engage in self-help in pursuit of a party's selfish
interests during a major dispute was left to the discretion and judgment of
that party, although procedures were established to deal with national
emergencies, and prior exhaustion of mediation or other procedural require-
ments was made a prerequisite to self-help action; and finally, the right to
engage in self-help in the resolution of minor disputes was either prohibited
or discouraged in favor of grievance and arbitration machinery, which was
insulated against judicial interference except under the most exceptional
circumstances. It was against this historical background that the Illinois
judiciary undertook to determine its proper role with respect to labor dis-
putes in the public sector.
THE ILLINOIS COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Prior to the New Deal turnaround, certain proclivities predominated
judicial thinking and conduct in the private sector labor cases: a socio-
economic philosophy which rendered the right of employees to act collec-
policy favoring arbitration of minor disputes, the Supreme Court, reversing an earlier decision,
held that a strike in violation of a no-strike clause can be enjoined and arbitration ordered when
the underlying dispute is arbitrable. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235
(1970). However, when the underlying dispute cannot be resolved under the arbitration proce-
dure, the Court has held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes the issuance of an injunction
notwithstanding the existence of a no-strike clause. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers
of America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
64. 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
65. 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
66. 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
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tively in pursuit of their self-interest subservient to the goal of employer
efficiency; the adoption of open-ended legal theories under which judicial
decisions could be based upon the views of individual judges rather than
recognized judicial principles; reliance upon vague statutory provisions to
rationalize desired conclusions; disregard of public policy as expressed by
the legislative and political branches; refusal to abide by explicit legislative
provisions; and use of the injunction as the chief weapon to nip in the bud
union self-help activity without prior adjudication of the issues involved in a
labor dispute. The discussion which ensues will demonstrate that the Illinois
judiciary has followed a very similar pattern in curbing the right of public
employees to strike and to enforce their collective bargaining agreements.
Legislative Background
Until 1965, the Illinois courts of appeal had no occasion to consider the
role to be played by state courts in public employee labor disputes. Although
legislative coverage existed in certain limited categories, the Illinois General
Assembly had failed to adopt a comprehensive public employee labor act.61
Two general statutes dealing with labor disputes, however, were not on their
face inapplicable to the public sector.
The Anti-Injunction Act, 68 adopted in 1925, prohibited injunctions in
any case growing out of or involving a labor dispute and the Uniform
Arbitration Act 69 provided that written agreements to arbitrate contract
disputes were valid and enforceable in court. 70 The fact that the latter
legislation had been adopted in 1961, the year following the Steelworkers
Trilogy, suggested that Illinois was fashioning a labor policy with respect to
arbitration of contract disputes similar to the federal policy.
71
An additional expression of apparent legislative intent was furnished by
67. For a history of the attempts to achieve this goal in the General Assembly, including a
1945 bill that was vetoed by the governor, see Goldstein, Current Trends in Public Employee
Labor Law in Illinois: Alice-in-Wonderland Revisited, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 382, 382-85
[hereinafter cited as Current Trends]. See note 2 supra.
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2a (1975). The Anti-Injunction Act had been challenged
before the Illinois Supreme Court, where it survived an attempt to emasculate it by reassertion
of the illegal purpose doctrine. Fenkse Bros. v. Upholsterers Int'l Union, 358 I11. 239, 193 N.E.
112, cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1934); see text accompanying notes 102-117 infra.
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 101-123 (1975).
70. Section 112(e) of the Uniform Arbitration Act provided that, in the case of a collective
bargaining agreement, the grounds for vacating an arbitration award would be those that existed
prior to the date of the enactment. Under pre-existing Illinois case law, absent fraud or similar
contentions, mistakes of an arbitrator as to either law or fact were not subject to court review
so long as the arbitrator acted within his authority. Stone v. Baldwin, 226 I11. 338, 345, 80 N.E.
890, 893 (1907).
71. Also leading to this conclusion were Illinois court holdings that arbitration was
favored as an alternative to protracted and expensive litigation. William B. Lucke, Inc. v.
Spiegel, 131 I11. App. 2d 532, 535, 266 N.E.2d 504, 507 (1970); School Dist. No. 46 v. Del
Bianco, 68 II1. App. 2d 145, 157, 215 N.E.2d 25, 31 (1966).
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the General Assembly when it conferred upon the Chicago Transit Authority
the right to continue the collective bargaining procedures that had been used
by the predecessor private transit company, including voluntary binding
arbitration of minor disputes. 72 With this legislative background available
for guidance, the Illinois courts began formulating policies to govern public
employee strikes and the enforcement of public employee collective bar-
gaining agreements.
The Right of Public Employees to Strike
The first consideration by the Illinois Supreme Court of the right of
public employees to strike was in 1965 in Board of Education v. Redding.73
A school board sued for an injunction when its custodians engaged in a
recognitional strike and picketing. On appeal by the school board to the
Illinois Supreme Court from an order dismissing its complaint, neither the
parties nor the court mentioned the Anti-Injunction Act. The union con-
ceded that school teachers could not strike, but argued that the prohibition
should not be extended to custodial employees.
The supreme court reversed and directed that the injunction issue. The
court asserted the following reasons for its decision: a "universal view" that
a strike of public employees for any purpose was illegal; the indispensability
of, and absence of a profit motive in, governmental functions as compared
with the private sector; and a state constitutional requirement that the
General Assembly "provide a thorough and efficient system of free
schools," with school employees viewed as agents of the public employer,
having a duty not to interfere with achievement of this objective. 74 Each of
the court's rationale merit analysis.
Universal View That Public Employee Strikes Are Illegal
The "universal view" argument was thinly supported by a threadbare
sampling of cases cited by the Illinois Supreme Court. If anything was
suggested, it was the lack of a sufficient number of public employee strikes
to warrant any generalization. Moreover, within a few years following
Redding, an impressive list of governmental bodies rejected this "universal
view. "
The legislatures of Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
and Vermont authorized teacher and other public employee strikes under
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 328a (1975). Collective bargaining over wages and
conditions of employment also had been legislatively authorized with respect to employees of
the state university system. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24'h, § 38b3(3) (1975).
73. 32 III. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
74. Id. at 571-73, 207 N.E.2d at 430.
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varying conditions, generally reserving the right to have the strike enjoined
should it threaten the public health, safety or welfare." The Supreme Court
of New Jersey saw no reason why its legislature could not find strikes by
public employees tolerable.76 The Supreme Court of Michigan refused to
uphold an injunction against a teacher strike absent a showing that the public
health, safety and welfare were adversely affected and that the public
employer had bargained in good faith." The Supreme Courts of Rhode
Island78 and New Hampshire79 adopted substantially the same position.
This method of dealing with the problem was substantially recom-
mended in the 1971 Illinois Governor's Commission Report which stated:
"[W]e have concluded that a limited right to strike be allowed public
employees whose continued service at the time is not held vital to public
health, safety, or welfare, provided that impasse procedures have run their
course.' '80 In addition, Executive Order No. 6, issued in 1973 by Governor
Daniel Walker, created collective bargaining rights and procedures for
employees of the state of Illinois similar to those conferred upon private
sector employees under the Labor Management Relations Act, 8 1 and con-
tained no restriction whatsoever upon the right to strike.8 2 This silence was
construed as de facto recognition by Governor Walker of the right-to-
strike.
8 3
75. See The Illinois Anti-Injunction Act, supra note 2, at 191 n.6. This legislative approach
is similar to that contained in the federal statutes governing the private sector to the extent that
the right to strike is conditioned upon special qualifications in emergency situations.
76. Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n, 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 867 (1968).
77. School Dist. for Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314,327, 157 N.W.2d 206,
211 (1968).
78. School Comm. of Westerly v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, Ill R.I. 96, 98, 299 A.2d 441,
445 (1973).
79. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated:
We are persuaded . . . that it would be detrimental to the smooth operation of the
collective bargaining process to declare that an injunction should automatically issue
where public teachers have gone on strike . . . .The essence of the collective
bargaining process is that the employer and the employees should work together in
resolving problems relating to the employment. The courts should intervene in this
process only where it is evident the parties are incapable of settling their disputes by
negotiation or by alternative methods such as arbitration and mediation ....
Judicial interference at any earlier stage could make the courts 'an unwitting third
party at the bargaining table and a potential coercive force in the collective bargaining
processes'. . . . Accordingly, it is our view that in deciding to withhold an injunction
the trial court may properly consider among other factors whether recognized
methods of settlement have failed, whether negotiations have been conducted in
good faith, and whether the public health, safety and welfare will be substantially
harmed if the strike is allowed to continue.
Timberland Regional School Dist. v. Timberlane Regional Educ. Ass'n, 114 N.H. 245, 317 A.2d
555, 558-59 (1974) (citations omitted).
80. COMMISSION ON LABOR LAWS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 19-20 (April 1971),
discussed in Current Trends, supra note 67, at 394.
81. See note 58 supra.
82. See Current Trends, supra note 67, at 394-95.
83. See Current Trends, supra note 67, at 400.
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It seems fair to conclude that the "universal view" is not universal at
all but represents the particular views of the members of the Illinois Su-
preme Court. There is a reason for this. Previously, Recorder Levy and the
anti-labor jurists that followed him were aligned with industry and adver-
saries of labor for reasons of social and economic class and because the
franchise was limited to property owners. Today in Illinois, judges are
dependent for their positions on officeholders who in turn are held account-
able by a broader electorate who must pay taxes to finance increased public
employee benefits. This dependence may provide a clue as to why the
''universal view" seen by the Illinois Supreme Court is perceived differ-
ently in other states where judges enjoy more independent tenure. This
seems especially logical since the view finds no support in Illinois statutory
law and has been consistently rejected by recent Illinois governors and
gubernatorial aspirants.84 Moreover, it is inconsistent with judicial and
executive determinations in several other states.
Indispensability of Government Functions and Lack of Profit Motive
The Redding court's notion that governmental functions may not be
impeded or obstructed by a public employee strike must be based upon
some concept of sovereignty. Under our system, however, sovereign power
is not unlimited.85
The court's rationale assumes that all government activities are inher-
ently so essential to society that they cannot be permitted to be impeded.
This argument, sometimes referred to as the "essentiality of functions"
doctrine, presupposes that all governmental functions are essential while all
private employer functions are nonessential, a contention that cannot with-
84. In the 1976 Illinois gubernatorial campaign, Democratic candidate Michael Howlett
promised to support a law giving public employees the right to strike and the victorious
Republican candidate, James Thompson, made a similar promise. Thompson's proposal would
retain in the judiciary the power to bar a strike which threatened the public health and safety.
Chicago Daily News, Oct. 15, 1976, at 58.
Academics have raised additional doubts about the "universal view." Robben Fleming
warned:
In my judgment the danger that any strike against the government will undermine
our democracy is counterbalanced by the equally dangerous contempt for the law
which results from the prohibition of all strikes and leads to its frequent violation. If
this prohibition continues, either it will lead to this contempt for the law, or there will
be great public pressure for it to be applied against the strike in the private sector as
well.
Introduction, FRONTIERS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 11-12 (1967); see also Panel Discussion of
Current Collective Bargaining Issues, 1968 Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA) 214-20.
85. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d II, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
Abolishing the partial sovereign immunity from tort liability of public school districts, the court
proclaimed that the concept "the King can do no wrong" had no place in American jurispru-
dence. For a discussion of the related argument that a public employee strike is tantamount to
an insurrection against the government, see The Illinois Anti-Injunction Act, supra note 2, at
195-97.
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stand the most cursory analysis. It is self-evident that a private utility
provides more essential functions than a public golf course. 86 Further, the
same functions often are performed interchangeably by government and
private enterprise in such fields as transit, nursing homes, hospitals, light,
water, other utilities, garbage collection, medical and social counseling and
services, golf courses, liquor sales and education.
The companion justification, that government differs from free enter-
prise because of the absence of the profit motive,8 7 is surely one of the most
ironic statements to be found in American judicial opinions. For more than a
hundred years, workers in the private sector were inhibited in the exercise of
their rights because of the profit motive in free enterprise. Starting with
Recorder Levy, they were told that their exercise of such rights was incom-
patible with their employers' ability to remain competitive in a "free
enterprise" market. Now, workers in the public sector are being told that
their rights are being restricted because of the lack of the profit motive.
In a sense, the court has resurrected the repudiated Massachusetts
doctrine, in which the working person was thought to have no recognizable
interest in the inferior wages and working conditions that prevailed in the
industry outside his own plant. The attempt now, though, is to isolate
employees in the public sector from their counterparts in the private sector.
Thus, in Redding, the Massachusetts doctrine is turned upside down. The
public employee is not seeking to exert economic pressure to raise the wages
and working conditions of strangers at other establishments; rather, he is
86. The irrationality of distinguishing between public and private sector strikes on the
basis of essentiality of functions was dramatically and convincingly illustrated by Judge Keat-
ing, dissenting in a New York case. At issue was whether public employees could be denied the
right to a jury trial when charged with criminal contempt. Judge Keating stated:
When it is remembered that employees of private utilities have the power to
plunge one of the great cities of the world into total darkness or complete silence, that
employees of privately owned railroads and shipping lines have the power to deprive
the residents of that city of vital food and fuel, that private sanitation workers, who
carry away a substantial portion of the refuse in New York City, have the power to
endanger the health of millions of its inhabitants and that thousands of other workers,
carrying out activities vital to the life and safety of the city, may demand a trial by
jury if they are charged with a violation of a court order restraining a strike, the
fallacy in the reasoning which would deny a jury trial to these defendants is readily
exposed. References to the dangers to the children from the teachers' strike, real as
those dangers may be, are not a substitute for a penetrating analysis of the labels
'public' and 'private' employees.
Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d II1, 134, 242 N.E.2d 802, 816, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625, 644 (1968). See
also The Illinois Anti-Injunction Act, supra note 2, at 198, nn.62-64, 68-70.
87. The premise is untenable in modern society. The court assumes a clear delineation
between nonprofit governmental bodies and private units engaged in free enterprise. The actual
fuzziness of the line is clear even from the cases heard and decided by the court. Compare a
governmentally-owned nursing home which is self-supporting and in competition with private
nursing homes (County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 111. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 929 (1971) (discussed in text following note 101 infra) with a private not-for-profit
hospital. Peters v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 44 III. 2d' 22, 253 N.E.2d 375 (1968)
(discussed in text following note 99 infra).
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trying to exert pressure upon his own employer to meet the higher-paid
private competition. 88 The public employer, with the aid of the courts, is
therefore enabled to maintain a competitive advantage over private enter-
prise.
89
Apparently the "sacred cow" has changed, but the Illinois judicial
view of the role of workers has remained constant. The judges who decided
the early American private sector cases believed that the societal goal was to
permit industry to produce at maximum efficiency and lowest cost, and
workers could not be permitted to obstruct that objective. Redding simply
substituted government for industry.
Like the Massachusetts majority, the Redding court failed to recognize
the fundamental and universal nature of the employer-employee relation-
ship. As Holmes stated: "One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is
made up is that between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his
services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his
services for the least possible return. "I One need only substitute the word
"government" for the word "capital," and the statement is transferable
from the private employer to the public employer. If capital serves as the
middleman, society pays for products in the form of prices, which presum-
ably will be raised if the worker receives more for his services. If govern-
ment serves as the middleman, society pays in the form of taxes, which
presumably will be raised if the worker receives more for his services. In
both cases, members of the judiciary have the same interest as any private
citizen in not paying more.
Operations of Schools Constitutionally Mandated
The court's unsupported assertion in Redding that organized strikes
against school boards are incompatible with the vague goal in the 1870
Illinois Constitution of providing a thorough and efficient system of free
schools is strongly reminiscent of judicial usurpation of power under the
criminal conspiracy and unlawful purpose doctrines. Without a citation of
authority or a word of testimony as to fact or expert opinion, the Illinois
Supreme Court found itself able to make this value judgment.
9 1
88. The contention has been advanced that to treat public employees disparately from
private employees is a wrong that can be elevated to the status of a constitutional violation.
See, e.g., The Illinois Anti-Injunction Act, supra, note 2, at 193-94.
89. To Recorder Levy, such a situation would be intolerable; he would argue that such
judicial favoritism to the public sector would assure the destruction of the free enterprise
system. See text following note 4 supra.
90. Vegalahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
91. Such judicial "legislation" based upon vague statutory provisions was later subjected
to severe criticism by Mr. Justice Jones in City of Pana v. Crowe, 13 III. App. 3d 90, 299 N.E.2d
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To buttress its constitutional argument, the court relied on an agency
theory, concluding that school employees were required to serve the public
without interruption. This rationale, however, does not apply well to other
situations. For example, since the Illinois Constitution establishes a state
treasurer, all employees of his office would be required to subordinate their
self-interest to that of the state. Such a doctrine might be viable when an
elected official performs substantially all the work of his office. However, it
has no logical application to industrialized and urbanized Illinois, where
hundreds or thousands of hired employees perform the work of an office that
a century ago was handled by a single elected public official. The court's
position further ignores the significant shift of employment from the private
to the public sector, bringing an ever-increasing segment of the work force
under the umbrella of the court's agency theory.92 If the government were to
become the sole employer of all citizens, this doctrine would require the
denial to all citizens of the right to economic self-help.
Contrary to the court's assumption, some writers have argued that the
educational system is not necessarily damaged and may even be improved as
a result of traditional collective bargaining, including the right to strike.93
The Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to latch onto a vague constitu-
tional provision, similar to the one in Illinois. It reasoned that "even where
the Constitution requires a public service to be rendered, as in the case of
free public schools, . . . there may be room for legislative judgment as to
what interruptions are compatible with the fulfillment of that mandate.94
Aftermath of Redding
Redding did not achieve stability in the public schools; it achieved
quite the contrary. Public employers, particularly school boards, reacted to
770 (1973). However, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, rejecting his admonition and assert-
ing the right of the judiciary to establish policy independent of the General Assembly. 57 Il. 2d
547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974). See discussion of the two opinions in the text accompanying notes
104-16 infra.
92. The tremendous growth in public employment at both state and local levels is demon-
strated in Public Employment in 1976, GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (Ref. File) (BNA) 71:2111. The
three fastest-growing unions in the United States are the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees, the American Federation of Government Employees and the Ameri-
can Federation of Teachers. See Cushman, Arbitration of Deadlocks in Public Employee
Bargaining, 1969 L.R.Y. (BNA) 329.
93. One writer compares the short-range effects of a brief teachers' strike, which may
have only minimal effect on school operations, and the long-range effects, which may increase
school efficiency if the teacher bargaining demands are beneficial to the students' education.
Note, Teacher Negotiations in Illinois: Current Status and Proposed Reforms, 1973 U. ILL.
L.F. 307, 334. Another text ridicules the anomaly of considering pupils irreparably damaged as
a result of a one-day teacher strike while assuming no harm is done to children when school is
closed for summer, holidays, teachers' conventions, inclement weather, presidential visits and
a host of other reasons. M. LIEBERMAN & M. MOSKOW, COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR
TEACHERS 299 (1966).
94. Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n, 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 867, 876 (1968).
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the declaration that their employees could not strike by stiffening their
bargaining positions. Strikes by public employees, virtually unknown in
Illinois prior to Redding, became commonplace, and union leaders were
sent to jail for violation of injunctive orders. 95 Communities and school
districts were torn apart by animosity. A new militancy arose within teacher
unions accompanied by a distinct hostility toward the judiciary.
The groundwork laid in Redding precipitated a series of cases dealing
with the right to strike. The Illinois courts wrestled with the problem and
encountered great difficulty in their attempt to formulate a rational and
consistent policy.
96
The "essentiality of functions" test asserted in Redding was next
considered in Peters v. South Chicago Community Hospital.97 Peters in-
volved a recognitional strike of employees of a private, not-for-profit hospi-
tal. The appellate court held that the strike was against public policy because
it impeded the operation of the hospital and thus had an illegal purpose.
Relying upon Redding, the court held the Anti-Injunction Act inapplicable.
Applying the essentiality of functions test, the court reasoned that if public
policy rendered a strike of school employees illegal, certainly a hospital
strike could not be tolerated.98
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, asserting, "[I]t was not this court
that declared the public policy [in Redding], as did the appellate court in this
case [Peters], it was the constitution that declared the public policy
.... ,,99 The supreme court found the Anti-Injunction Act controlling in
95. See Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed'n of Teachers, Local 886, 46 I11. 2d 439, 264
N.E.2d 15 (1970); County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 I11. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971); Board of Junior Colleges v. Cook County College Teachers Union,
126 II1. App. 2d 418, 262 N.E.2d 125 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 998 (1971). But see Board of
Educ. v. Morton Council Teachers Local 571, 50111. 2d 258, 278 N.E.2d 769 (1972), where there
was a retrenchment when the court was faced with the prospect of jailing 64 of the 378 teachers
in a high school district. The disinclination of the executive passively to accept the judiciary's
handling of public employee strikes through contempt proceedings was evidenced by Governor
Walker's issuance of pardons to the union leaders who had been jailed. For a comparison of the
response of the executive and legislative branches to use of the labor injunction in the private
sector cases, see note 25 supra.
96. Following Redding, the use of the labor injunction in the public sector in many
respects repeated the private sector experience. Although Illinois statutory law carefully
prescribed due process procedures to be followed in injunction proceedings, the appellate
courts held that the failure of a chancellor to comply with those procedures was not a
jurisdictional defect and, therefore, afforded a union no effective remedy on appeal if it had
disobeyed the injunction. Hence, as in the case of private employee unions prior to adoption of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the labor injunction could be used with impunity to curb public
employee unions and they had no meaningful legal recourse to challenge its abuse. See Board of
Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Local 1600, 42
Ill. App. 3d 1056, 356 N.E.2d 1089 (1976).
97. 107 III. App. 2d 460, 246 N.E.2d 840, rev'd, 44 II1. 2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375 (1969).
98. 107 II1. App. 2d at 467-69, 246 N.E.2d at 843-44.
99. 44 I11. 2d at 27, 253 N.E.2d at 378 (emphasis added).
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Peters in the absence of any contrary constitutional requirement or legisla-
tive enactment, stating: "The language of the statute is clear and it makes no
exceptions for hospitals."1
00
Thus, whereas the appellate court in Peters had used the illegal purpose
doctrine to reach the result desired by the judges, the Illinois Supreme Court
seemed to accept the concept that policy-making was a legislative and not a
judicial function.
The following year, 1970, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the issuance of an injunction against an
economic strike by employees of a county nursing home. In County of
Peoria v. Benedict, 10' the court decided the issue with the curt statement
that in Peters "we held the Illinois anti-injunction law applicable to employ-
ees of a non-profit hospital. For the same reasons stated therein, we find the
anti-injunction act . . . applicable to the instant case."
'' 0 2
The court had now applied the Anti-Injunction Act to public employ-
ees. It thus appeared that the only exception to the application of the Anti-
Injunction Act which survived from Redding was an overriding constitu-
tional or legislative expression of public policy. The single situation where
such an exception had been found was stated in Redding, i.e., the constitu-
tional mandate of providing public schools; with the adoption of the 1970
Illinois Constitution, that constitutional provision was made applicable only
to primary and secondary public schools.'1 03 Although the Anti-Injunction
Act was applied to public employees in Benedict, the operation of the
county nursing home there was, in competition with private nursing homes,
a voluntary and proprietary function. Thus, the court had yet to rule on a
public employee "essential function" case comparable to Peters.
Such a case arose in the City of Pana, Illinois. An economic strike by
municipal employees was enjoined on the grounds that the strike directly
interfered with the operation of the city's water, sewer, street and police
departments, which were indisputably essential to the health, safety and
welfare of the city's inhabitants.
In a two-to-one decision, the appellate court in City of Pana v.
Crowe'04 found Benedict rather than Redding controlling. Writing for the
100. Id.
101. 47 Il1. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971).
102. Id. at 169-70, 265 N.E.2d at 143.
103. The Anti-Injunction Act was declared to be overridden by the constitutional duty to
provide public schools in Allen v. Maurer, 6 Ill. App. 3d 633, 644, 286 N.E.2d 135, 143 (1972).
Illinois courts, however, have chosen to ignore the fact that the 1970 Illinois Constitution
mandates free public education only through the secondary level. ILL. CONST. art. X, § I.
Hence, the public college teacher unions urged inclusio unius est exclusio alterius-the corol-
lary principle to Redding would logically be that teachers in the public colleges could strike.
104. 13 I1. App. 3d 90, 299 N.E.2d 770 (1973).
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majority, Mr. Justice Jones took a cue from Justices Holmes and Brandeis
and refused to override the express prohibition of the Anti-Injunction Act on
the basis of "general, scattered and indirect and . . . vague" constitutional
and statutory provisions relating to performance of the impaired municipal
services. He stated that any labor-management policy should emanate from
the General Assembly, not the courts. 
105
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed that decision, flatly declaring
public employee strikes illegal. 1°6 Mr. Justice Schaefer, writing for the
court, conceded that the plain language of the Anti-Injunction Act supported
the appellate court holding that its scope encompassed public employee
strikes. Nevertheless, he held the statute inapplicable to such strikes. He
premised his holding primarily upon two assertions. He found, first, that the
history of the statute clearly established that its purpose was to prohibit the
enjoining only of "lawful conduct." Cited as authority for this proposition
was an earlier Illinois Supreme Court decision, Fenske Brothers v. Uphol-
sterers International Union .107 Second, he asserted that at the time the
Illinois Act was adopted in 1925, strikes by governmental employees were
universally considered unlawful and "that view prevails generally today in
the absence of legislative sanction. "108
Mr. Justice Schaefer was plainly wrong about the purpose of the Anti-
Injunction Act. The history of the Anti-Injunction Act shows that its purpose
was to prohibit courts from enjoining peaceful strikes and picketing through
application of the unlawful purpose doctrine. 109 Moreover, Fenske Brothers
clearly demonstrates that the history and purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act
are diametrically opposed to Mr. Justice Schaefer's conclusion. "0 There,
105. Id. at,94, 299 N.E.2d at 773.
106. 57 I11. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974).
107. 358 I11. 239, 193 N.E.2d 112, cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1934).
108. 57 I11. 2d at 549, 316 N.E.2d at 514.
109. Upon the adoption of the Clayton Act by Congress, many state legislatures reacted by
enacting "little Clayton Acts," modeled after section 20 of the federal law. Among these
enactments was the Illinois Anti-Injunction Act of 1925. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2(a) (1975).
The statute avoided the ambiguity which had been relied upon by Mr. Justice Pitney in Deering
four years earlier (see text following note 31 supra) to emasculate section 20 of the federal
statute and revitalize the unlawful purpose doctrine. The Illinois law simply prohibited any
Illinois court or judge from issuing a restraining order or an injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment. Unlike section 20 of
the Clayton Act, which applied "in any case between an employer and employees," the Anti-
Injunction Act contained no reference to an "employer" or "employee" which might invite a
restrictive application of the Anti-Injunction Act. The conclusion is inescapable that the Illinois
General Assembly intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply to all labor disputes regardless of
the parties involved.
110. Additionally, Mr. Justice Schaefer furnished no authority for his statement that public
employee strikes were universally considered unlawful in 1925, nor was it shown what public
employee strikes had occurred as of that time. Furthermore, his statement that the view
continues today in the absence of legislative sanction failed to take into account the decisions of
the supreme courts of New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Michigan. See notes 77-79 supra.
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the Illinois Supreme Court rejected an attempt to narrow the scope of the
Anti-Injunction Act and held that its scope was all-inclusive."''
Although it was not the purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act to exclude
any classification of employees from its coverage, Mr. Justice Schaefer was
correct in concluding that the Anti-Injunction Act was not intended to bar an
injunction against unlawful actions. The Anti-Injunction Act did not insulate
"illegal conduct" such as violence to person or property, intimidation or
threats of violence. In other words, strikes were protected against injunction
regardless of purpose so long as the strikers behaved themselves in accord-
ance with normal proscriptions established under criminal and civil law.
However, by expanding that limited area of enjoinable conduct, the court in
Pana revitalized the "unlawful purpose" doctrine which Fenske Brothers
found had been outlawed by the Anti-Injunction Act. Mr. Justice Schaefer's
legal exercise is logically indistinguishable from that employed by Mr.
Justice Pitney in the Deering case except that Mr. Justice Pitney emas-
culated section 20 of the Clayton Act through statutory interpretation, while
Mr. Justice Schaefer concedes that the Anti-Injunction Act is contrary on its
face to his interpretation. Mr. Justice Pitney found an illegal purpose in
union organizational strikes; Mr. Justice Schaefer found an illegal purpose
in union strikes against a public employer.
An additional parallel exists between the Pitney and Schaefer opinions.
Pitney's interpretation of the Clayton Act perpetuated the Massachusetts
doctrine that employees of the target employer were permitted to engage in
primary strikes, but participation by strangers was outlawed as an "illegal
purpose." This "classification of persons" concept was not eliminated in
the private sector until the adoption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Like
Pitney, Schaefer interprets the Anti-Injunction Act so as to create a "clas-
sification of persons," e.g., public employees, who are denied the protec-
tion of the Anti-Injunction Act, once again on the basis of an "illegal
purpose."
I 1l. In Fenske Bros., a group of corporations was seeking to sustain the action of a trial
court, which had enjoined a private sector union from striking and picketing in support of its
demand for a closed shop. The corporations argued the illegal purpose doctrine, citing many of
the exhaustive list of cases that had followed the Massachusetts view. Illinois was among the
states that had followed this view. O'Brien v. People, 216 II1. 354, 75 N.E. 108 (1905). The
Illinois Supreme Court disposed of this argument, noting: "Each of the cases ... cited ...
was decided before there was any legislation in this State upon the question here involved." 358
I1. at 246, 193 N.E. at 116. The court found that, regardless of how the judiciary had
determined the legal status of labor activities prior to the enactment of the Anti-Injunction Act,
the purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act was to legalize the activities to which the Anti-
Injunction Act applied. As a result of Fenske Bros., the illegal purpose doctrine and the labor
injunction were thought to have been outlawed in Illinois until the Pana decision held other-
wise.
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Mr. Justice Schaefer asserted another ground upon which to support the
Pana decision: "It may also be noted that the Federal counterpart of the
statute involved in this case, the Norris-LaGuardia Act . . . was held to be
inapplicable to employees of the Federal Government.""12 Ignored was the
fact that this argument was heard but not adopted by the Illinois Supreme
Court in the Benedict case. In Benedict, several arguments were made
before the court. First, the Anti-Injunction Act predated the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act, was a counterpart of section 20 of the Clayton Act, and was
carefully drafted to avoid the problems that had resulted in nullification of
section 20.113 Second, the United States Supreme Court decision interpret-
ing the Norris-LaGuardia Act to ban strikes by federal employees issued in
1947, the same year that Congress explicitly illegalized such conduct in the
Taft-Hartley Act. Third, numerous bills had been submitted to the Illinois
General Assembly without passage which sought to ban public employee
strikes, measures that would seem superfluous if strikes were already en-
joinable. 114 Thus, Benedict contradicts Mr. Justice Schaefer's analogy to
the federal law.
According to Mr. Justice Schaefer, the General Assembly had ac-
quiesced in the view he espoused in Pana because, since 1925, it had
enacted collective bargaining statutes for certain public employees but "it
has refused to interfere with the conclusion that a strike of public employees
is unlawful.""15 Not explained is how the General Assembly could possibly
be cognizant of any such conclusion in view of Illinois case law prior to the
supreme court's Pana decision. The opposite conclusion logically would be
derived from a reading of Illinois Supreme Court decisions; specifically,
that the illegal purpose doctrine did not survive the Anti-Injunction Act
(Fenske Brothers), the Anti-Injunction Act was applicable in the absence of
constitutional or statutory expressions of public policy to the contrary
(Peters), and the Anti-Injunction Act was applicable to public employees
(Benedict).
112. 57 I11. 2d at 550, 316 N.E.2d at 514.
113. Every reference in the federal statute that could be construed to make the Anti-
Injunction Act applicable only to private employers had been deleted in the drafting of the Anti-
Injunction Act. For example, where the Clayton Act applied "in any case between an employer
and employees . . . involving or growing out of a dispute..." 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), the Anti-
Injunction Act applied "in any case involving or growing out of a dispute..."ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, § 2(a) (1975). Similarly, whereas the Norris-LaGuardia Act had been construed by the
United States Supreme Court to define an employer in such a way as to exclude the United
States, (United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947)), the Anti-
Injunction Act was in all respects drawn so as to apply to all employers including governmental
employers (see generally County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 III. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971)).
114. In Benedict, the union relied on Board of Educ. v. Public School Employees' Union,
233 Minn. 144, 45 N.W.2d 797 (1951), in which the Minnesota Anti-Injunction Act was applied
to the public sector, largely on the basis of these three points.
115. 57 I11. 2d at 552, 316 N.E.2d at 515.
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Obliquely recognizing the inconsistency of Pana with the latter two
decisions, the court stated:
It is therefore appropriate to repeat what has often been said
before, that the public policy of the State is not found solely in the
provisions of the Constitution . . . . In our opinion neither the
Peters case nor the Benedict case requires that we depart in this
case from the longstanding rule that public employees have no
right to strike and that a strike by them is unlawful and, therefore,
not within the scope of the anti-injunction act.ll
6
In short, the court discarded its pronouncement in Peters that public policy
emanates from the Constitution and the legislature, not from the courts, and
resurrected the illegal purpose doctrine under which an individual judge
declares the law to be as the judge determines.
Concluding his opinion in Pana, Mr. Justice Schaefer offered the
essentiality of functions doctrine as an additional supporting rationale. A
distinction between public and private employees based on that theory has
no factual or logical underpinning." 7 Moreover, that doctrine was rejected
in Peters as a proper basis for judicial intervention. Since Peters still stands
as controlling law in private sector cases, there is no rational basis for
applying the doctrine to the public sector.
In sum, the decisions following Redding show that the Illinois Su-
preme Court has repeated the early private sector history by applying its own
socio-economic views rather than established principles of law in order to
support its conclusion that public employees cannot strike. The judges once
again have determined that the employees' right to act in their own self-
interest must defer to the employers' right to operate without interference
resulting from employee discontent.
The Right of Public Employees to Enforce Their
Collective Bargaining Agreements
The same tendency for the Illinois judiciary to apply its own socio-
economic views in place of established legal principles has emerged with
regard to the second major area of public employee case law, enforceability
of contracts. In so doing, however, the Illinois courts have not followed any
antiquated private sector judicial pattern because, by the time the issue arose
in the private sector, the federal courts and Congress favored enforcement of
labor contracts. Nevertheless, the Illinois courts did adapt the pre-existing
non-delegability of governmental powers theory, stretching it to stifle most
attempts to enforce collective bargaining agreements when school boards
desired to extricate themselves from the bargains they had made."
8
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. See text accompanying notes 85-90 supra.
118. This use of the non-delegability theory is not universal. As the Ohio Supreme Court
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Initially, the Illinois judiciary seemed to be moving in the federal
direction, which favored collective bargaining and arbitration of contract
disputes. The first case, Chicago Division of Illinois Education Association
v. Board of Education of Chicago, 19 dealt with the issue of whether, in the
absence of explicit statutory authorization, a school board can recognize and
contract with an exclusive collective bargaining representative selected by
its teachers. Two legal theories predominated in the arguments before the
appellate court: (1) whether the board had an implied power to take such
action; and (2) whether such an act constituted an ultra vires delegation of
the board's duties and responsibilities.120 Case law had very narrowly
construed the scope of powers that were implied, rather than specifically
granted, to school boards under the Illinois School Code. 121 Further, three
existing Illinois decisions had forbidden school boards to delegate to other
parties the decision-making responsibility which the School Code lodged in
the boards.' 
22
Nevertheless, after a careful review of the arguments, the appellate
court seemed to conclude that collective bargaining contracts were no more
a delegation of the board's powers than any other contract for goods or
services would be. The court stated:
The fact that the municipality engages in collective bargaining
does not necessarily mean that it has surrendered its decision
making authority with respect to public employment. The final
decision as to what terms and conditions of employment the
municipality will agree to, or whether it will agree at all, still rests
solely with its legislative body.
23
The court then held that the Board did not require legislative authority to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a sole collective bargain-
ing agency selected by its teachers, and that such an agreement was not
against public policy. 1
24
has recognized, it amounts to little more than a public body reneging on its agreements. Dayton
Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975).
119. 76 111. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966).
120. For some inexplicable reason, the cqurt treated these theories separately, seemingly
unaware that they coalesce into a single proposition. If a school board has an implied power to
do something, then the commission of the act cannot be ultra vires. Conversely, if the
commission of the act is ultra vires, then the board cannot have the implied power.
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 1-1 to 36-1 (1975); see, e.g., Rosenheim v. City of Chicago,
12 Ill. App. 2d 382, 139 N.E.2d 856 (1956); City of Chicago v. Barnett, 404 Ill. 136, 88 N.E.2d
477 (1949).
122. Elder v. Board of Educ., 60 Il. App. 2d 56, 208 N.E.2d 423 (1965); Stroh v. Casner,
201 Ill. App. 281 (1916), and Linblad v. Board of Educ., 211 I1. 261,77 N.E. 450 (1906). Under
this illegal delegation doctrine, in Linblad a board was prohibited from delegating to a state
agency its responsibility to select and place student practice teachers; in Casner two boards
were prohibited from building a common schoolhouse for joint education of children in the two
districts; and in Elder a board was prohibited from assigning to its superintendent its statutory
responsibilities concerning teachers.
123. 76 Ill. App. 2d at 472, 222 N.E.2d at 251.
124. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court declined to review this decision. 35 II. 2d 630 (1967).
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During the next six years, public sector collective bargaining in Illinois
proliferated. The contracts by and large incorporated mechanisms developed
in the private sector, including compulsory and binding arbitration to re-
solve grievances. Arbitrators who had developed expertise and reputations
in private sector labor disputes were chosen to hear public sector cases, and
a substantial body of public sector arbitral common law began to emerge.
This apparent stability was suddenly shattered for Illinois school dis-
tricts when the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District decided
Board of Education v. Rockford Education Association125 and thereby cast
great doubt on the meaning of Chicago Division. A collective bargaining
agreement between the Rockford school district and its teachers' association
contained a clause requiring that promotions be filled in accordance with
certain specified procedures and "on the basis of qualifications for the
vacant post."1 26 A teacher grieved, alleging that the Board failed to follow
the contract procedures governing promotions and claiming that he was
entitled to be promoted to a vacant administrative position. When the
association demanded selection of an arbitrator from the American Arbitra-
tion Association list, the board sued, and the chancellor enjoined arbitration.
The appellate court affirmed, stating:
It has been held that a board of education does not require
legislative authority to enter into a collective bargaining agreement
and that such an agreement is not against public policy. However,
a board may not, through a collective bargaining agreement or
otherwise, delegate to another party those matters of discretion
that are vested in the board by statute. The School Code provides
that the board has the duty 'To appoint all teachers and fix the
amount of their salaries . .. .'
The cases have held that these are among the powers and
duties of a board that cannot be delegated or limited by contract
... . The ultimate determination of 'qualification' was not, nor
could it be, delegated by the Board to any outside agency includ-
ing the American Arbitration Association.
127
Rockford is unclear as to whether the court was holding that the subject
matter involved in the dispute was beyond the purview of collective bargain-
ing or was merely inarbitrable. If the former, Rockford would seem to be
irreconcilable with Chicago Division, despite the court's disinclination to
directly repudiate that decision. If the court was asserting that none of the
125. 3 11. App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (1972),
126. Id. at 1093, 280 N.E.2d at 287.
127. Id. at 1093-94, 280 N.E.2d at 287-88 (citations omitted). It is assumed that the court
was alluding to the arbitration of the grievance. The court's opaque reference to a delegation to
any outside agency, including the American Arbitration Association [hereinafter referred to in
the text as AAA], evidences an apparent misunderstanding of the function of the AAA, which
assists parties in selecting an arbitrator to hear the case. The AAA itself does not adjudicate
grievances.
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powers of a school board derived from the School Code can be made the
subject matter of a collective bargaining agreement, collective bargaining
would in effect be permissible as to form, but not as to any possible content,
since the only powers a school board has are those specified in, and
incidental to, the School Code. Furthermore, Rockford ignored the fact that
Chicago Division had rejected the applicability of the illegal delegation
doctrine to collective bargaining, and in doing so, had found inapplicable
the same three cases that Rockford relied upon in support of its holding.' 
28
Each of the pivotal cases involved a situation where a school board had
delegated to another party a decision-making responsibility conferred upon
it by the School Code. They certainly are distinguishable from the case of a
collective bargaining contract in which a school board agrees to conditions
of employment as consideration for the teachers' agreement to render
services. Were the giving of consideration declared illegal, no school board
could operate because it could not enter into any contract necessary to
implement its specific powers.
On the other hand, it might be assumed that the Rockford court was
taking the narrower position that only the agreement to submit the grievance
to binding arbitration constituted an illegal delegation of the Board's pow-
ers. It then becomes difficult to comprehend how the court could uphold a
board's power to enter into a contract but not the power to agree to arbitrate
a dispute arising under it.
129
The Rockford court also had no reason to conclude that the Board
would have been deprived of its ultimate right to judge qualifications and
select candidates for promotion if the arbitration proceedings had been
held. 130 The grievance in Rockford, if arbitrated, undoubtedly would have
decided the issue of whether the Board had adhered to the procedural
requirements it had agreed to, but not the issue of determination of qualifica-
tions.
Whatever Rockford held, it clearly reflected a departure from the basic
socio-economic orientation of Chicago Division, which favored and
128. See note 122 supra.
129. See Note, Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Dis-
putes in Public Employment, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 133 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Agree-
ments to Arbitrate]. See also School Dist. No. 46 v. Del Bianco, 68 I1l. App. 2d 145, 215 N.E.2d
25 (1966), where the same court that decided Rockford enforced an arbitration clause in a
contract between a school board and an architect for professional services in connection with
the construction of a school building.
130. In private sector collective bargaining agreements, this subjective adjudicative func-
tion is consistently left to management. Also, an arbitrator will not attribute a contrary intent to
the parties absent clear contract language so stating. Should an employer be challenged, the
normal arbitral test is whether the exercise of its discretion was unreasonable, capricious,
arbitrary or discriminatory. See E. ELKOURI & F. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 387-88
(BNA, rev. ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as How ARBITRATION WORKS], and cases cited therein.
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facilitated collective bargaining in the public sector. As a result, there was
uncertainty as to the finality and legality of arbitration in the public schools.
School boards began either to seek injunctions preventing arbitration or to
vacate unfavorable awards. Thus, arbitration became virtually meaningless
as the final method of resolving contractual disputes.
The ambiguity in Rockford as to whether the nondelegability doctrine
was a limitation on the scope of permissible contract subject matter or only
on grievance arbitration l3 l seemingly was resolved in three subsequent
appellate court decisions: Board of Education v. Johnson, 132 Classroom
Teachers Association v. Board of Education,133 and Illinois Education
Association Local Community High School District 218 & Henry Davis v.
Board of Education of District 218.134
Johnson involved a grievance over an involuntary transfer of a senior
teacher from one school within the district to another. Under the collective
bargaining contract, two of the criteria required to be used in selecting
teachers for involuntary transfer were seniority and qualifications. Four
guidelines for determining qualifications were specified. When the union
sought arbitration of the grievance, alleging noncompliance with these
procedures, the board obtained an injunction preventing the arbitration. The
Illinois Appellate Court for the First District affirmed.
The court opined that Rockford was entirely consistent with Chicago
Division, concluding that "Rockford simply stated that certain decisional
matters, although contained in the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, could not be delegated."-1 35 The court further stated that, both in
Rockford and in the instant case, 136 grievance arbitration and not interest
arbitration was involved and that "in this opinion we are addressing our-
selves only to grievance arbitration."'
37
131. The state courts sometimes have confused grievance arbitration with contract bargain-
ing, as was noted by Judge Hoffman, dissenting in Gary Teachers Local No. 4 v. School City of
Gary, 152 Ind. App. 591, 284 N.E.2d 108, 115 (1972). Negotiation of a collective bargaining
contract resolves an interest or major dispute. Interest arbitration involves an arbitrator
deciding what terms will be included in the agreement. Grievance arbitration resolves a dispute
over the interpretation, construction or application of a contract. Such a dispute is called a
rights or minor dispute. How ARBITRATION WORKS, supra note 130, at 30, 31; Agreements to
Arbitrate, supra note 129, at n.6.
132. 21 111. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (1974).
133. 15 Il. App. 3d 224, 304 N.E.2d 516 (1973).
134. 23 Il. App. 3d 649, 320 N.E.2d 240 (1974), rev'd, 62 Ill. 2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7 (1975).
135. 21 111. App. 3d at 488, 315 N.E.2d at 639.
136. A second grievance was also involved in this appeal. The union had successfully
arbitrated a contractual provision insulating teachers from any obligation to perform functions
"clerical in nature." A violation occurred when the administration required the teachers to
write in the names of their students on attendance cards, a task until then performed by the
school clerk. Reversing the chancellor, who had set aside the arbitrator's award, the appellate
court held that nothing in the School Code barred arbitration of this dispute. Id. at 494-95, 315
N.E.2d at 644.
137. Id. at 488 n.ll, 315 N.E.2d at 639 n.ll.
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The court noted that in the absence of public employment legislation
creating a basis for arbitration, the sole legal basis of arbitration was the
holding in Chicago Division. Therefore, the court continued, "we cannot
say that all disputes arising' from the collective bargaining agreement are
proper subjects for binding arbitration."'
38
Hence, the court seemingly concluded that the permissible scope of the
arbitration clause is narrower than the permissible scope of the subject
matter of the collective bargaining agreement. Not explained was how
collective bargaining over subject matter within the authority of the board
can be any less a delegation of that board's powers than the submission to an
arbitrator of a dispute over the interpretation, construction or application of
the agreement which was the product of the collective bargaining.' 39 This
gap in judicial reasoning is further widened by the failure of the appellate
court even to consider the general legislative policy in Illinois favoring
arbitration of contract disputes as primarily evidenced by the adoption of the
Uniform Arbitration Act. 14°
Seeking standards to determine which grievance disputes were arbitr-
able, the court reverted to the Rockford doctrine that the powers granted to
school boards under the School Code were nondelegable and, therefore, not
arbitrable. Finding that the board ultimately had the responsibility of deter-
mining qualifications for involuntary transfer, it barred arbitration of the
issue of whether the board had complied with the procedures and utilized the
guidelines contractually required in the making of this determination. The
court concluded,
[T]o allow an arbitrator to review the decision of the administra-
tion would permit the substitution of the arbitrator's judgment as
to the relative importance of each guideline in the ultimate deci-
sion. This, in effect, would result in the arbitrator determining the
teacher's qualifications and, ... that decision is to be made by
the school administration.'
4'
This conclusion seems unwarranted because the purpose of arbitration
would merely be to ascertain whether the board had adhered to the
guidelines specified in the contract. The contract did not authorize the
arbitrator to second-guess the board in its application of those guidelines.
138. Id. at 491, 315 N.E.2d at 641.
139. See note 131 supra; Agreements to Arbitrate, supra note 129.
140. See text accompanying notes 67-94 supra. Only one Illinois appellate court decision
even remotely deals with this consideration. Referring to non-delegability cases, where the law
prohibits arbitration over the subject matter, the First District held that "the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act does not provide the exclusive remedy for restraining arbitration .... ." Board of
Trustees of Junior College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Local 1600, 22 II1.
App. 3d 1053, 1056, 318 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1974), aff'd without consideration of this issue, 62 I11.
2d 470, 343 N.E.2d 473 (1976).
141. 21 111. App. 3d at 493, 315 N.E.2d at 643.
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Rockford and Johnson both had denied an arbitrator the opportunity to
review an alleged procedural violation because the board was empowered to
make the ultimate substantive decision based upon its assessment of qualifi-
cations. But the Third District in Classroom Teachers and the First District
in Illinois Education Association held that a court could review and cure
alleged procedural violations under similar circumstances.
In Classroom Teachers, a school board involuntarily transferred a
teacher from the position of counselor to instructor, failing to comply with
specified procedural prerequisites contained in the collective bargaining
agreement. Overruling the chancellor, who had found Rockford controlling,
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District stated:
The Board has voluntarily agreed to follow reasonable and
fair evaluation procedures preliminary to any involuntary transfer
of the teacher. If the Board had kept its bargain it would have had
the basis of making an informed judgment prior to the transfer of
the plaintiff teacher who, in turn, would have had clear warning of
her deficiencies with ample opportunity to correct them or to
suffer the consequences. We believe that such a bargain is con-
sonant with public policy and should be enforced.' 42
Since both Johnson and Classroom Teachers involved procedures
governing involuntary transfer of tenured teachers, there is an apparent
conflict between the First and Third Districts. The only distinction between
the cases seems to be that Johnson involved arbitrability and Classroom
Teachers involved court enforcement.
In Illinois Education Association, a nontenured teacher was terminated
for cause. The chancellor held the discharge improper because of failure to
follow the classroom evaluation procedures required under the collective
bargaining contract, and reinstated the teacher.
The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed, finding no material
distinction between the case before it and Classroom Teachers. 143 In both
cases, the board had agreed with the union to a procedural condition
precedent to an involuntary change in employment status, and then had
attempted to alter that status without complying with the agreed procedures.
The comparison drawn in Illinois Education Association to Classroom
Teachers could just as easily have been made to Rockford or Johnson. The
only apparent material distinction between the four cases was that two were
arbitrability cases while the other two involved court enforcement of collec-
tive bargaining contracts. Thus it appeared that the Illinois appellate courts
were saying the nondelegability doctrine limited an arbitrator's authority,
142. 15 III. App. 3d at 229, 304 N.E.2d at 520.
143. 23 Iii. App. 3d 649, 659, 320 N.E.2d 240, 247-48 (1974).
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but not that of a court, to impinge upon a board's discretionary powers when
awarding relief for violation of a collective bargaining contract. The impli-
cation was that the ambiguity in Rockford had been resolved and that, while
the authority of the arbitrator was curtailed, the permissible subject matter of
collective bargaining was not being limited. However, this seeming recon-
ciliation of the appellate court decisions was short-lived because two cases
followed in which courts refused to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments.
In Wesclin Education Association v. Board of Education,'44 the Ap-
pellate Court for the Fifth District addressed the issue of whether a school
board can impose upon itself conditions precedent to dismissal of a non-
tenured teacher, in excess of the conditions imposed by the Illinois School
Code. A professional negotiations agreement required that the discharge of a
teacher be preceded by an evaluation procedure. The court held that such an
agreement was at variance with the School Code and, therefore, ultra vires
and unenforceable in court. 145 The court observed that the School Code
vested in boards of education the authority to dismiss teachers; that this
authority was limited by certain specified rights of tenured teachers; but that
nontenured teachers were entitled only to receive sixty days' written notice
of termination. The court then held: "We believe that just as a school board
cannot abrogate the procedural safeguards accorded tenured teachers, neith-
er can it, by means of a collective bargaining agreement, destroy the
flexibility accorded it with respect to the dismissal of nontenured
teachers. '' 146
The court recognized that its decision conflicted with the position taken
by the First District in Illinois Education Association. However, it opined
that its treatment of the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract was
reconcilable with the Third District's decision in Classroom Teachers
which dealt with the involuntary transfer of a tenured teacher: "We find this
distinction significant since the School Code establishes, and maintains,
numerous distinctions between the rights accorded to tenured teachers and
those accorded to nontenured teachers."1
47
Support subsequently was given to Wesclin when, in 1975, the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the First District's decision in Illinois
Education Association. 148 The court held that the board's powers under the
School Code with regard to the nonrenewal of contracts of nontenured
teachers were nondelegable.149 Therefore, the court chose to construe the
144. 30 I11. App. 3d 67, 331 N.E.2d 335 (1975).
145. Id. at 77, 331 N.E.2d at 342.
146. Id. at 76, 331 N.E.2d at 341.
147. Id. at 75, 331 N.E.2d at 340.
148. 62 I11. 2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7 (1975).
149. Id. at 130, 340 N.E.2d at 9.
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collective bargaining agreement as not expanding the rights conferred upon
a nontenured teacher under the School Code, in effect abrogating the
additional procedures contained in the contract. Accordingly, since the
plaintiff teacher had been terminated in compliance with his rights under the
School Code, the court found that the action of the board was valid under
both state law and the collective bargaining agreement.
Additional confusion was engendered when the Third District inter-
preted its earlier Classroom Teachers decision in Lockport Area Special
Education Co-operative v. Lockport Area Special Education Cooperative
Association. 150 Before the court was the issue of arbitrability of the non-
renewal of a probationary teacher under a clause which required the school
board to establish "just cause" in support of a refusal to retain the teacher.
The court first agreed with Wesclin that the provision could not be enforced
because it conflicted with the exclusive School Code procedures with regard
to nontenured teachers. 5 ' Two of the three justices went further, however,
explicating the basis of Classroom Teachers. That case, they explained,
involved a procedural prerequisite to the exercise of board discretion, which
was enforceable, as contrasted to the delegation by a board of the actual
substantive decision to another party, which was unenforceable. 52 Since
Classroom Teachers involved court enforcement while Lockport involved
arbitrability, the court implied it was not material which was involved. This
explanation left no means of reconciling Classroom Teachers with Rock-
ford and Johnson, where the procedural prerequisites had been held inar-
bitrable. Except in the case of nontenured teachers, where Illinois Education
Association seems to govern, that conflict between the appellate courts has
not been squarely resolved.
The rationale introduced by the Fifth District in Wesclin, followed in
Lockport and reiterated by the Illinois Supreme Court in Illinois Education
Association, was one grounded upon the exclusivity of the School Code
procedures for nontenured teachers. That rationale became muddled when
the Illinois Supreme Court reached the same result in a nontenured teacher
termination case, in the absence of such "exclusive" statutory procedures.
That case was one of three arbitration cases involving the Cook County
College Teachers Union.153 The grievances were based upon the alleged
failure of the college board to follow evaluation procedures contained in a
collective bargaining agreement, the same issue as was involved in Wesclin
and Illinois Education Association.
150. 33 I1. App. 3d 789, 338 N.E.2d 463 (1975).
151. Id. at 792-93, 338 N.E.2d at 465-66.
152. Id. at 793-94, 338 N.E.2d at 466-67.
153. Board of Trustees of Junior College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers
Local 1600, 62 111. 2d 470, 343 N.E.2d 473 (1976) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the
College Teachers Trilogy].
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Before the supreme court, the union contended that, unlike the School
Code, the Public Community College Act did not contain a procedure
governing renewal of nontenured faculty members; it merely authorized the
board to devise a tenure policy. 15 4 In pursuance of that statutory power, the
board had negotiated with the union the evaluation procedures which were at
issue and those procedures had been incorporated into the board's rules.
Therefore, the union contended the converse of Illinois Education Associa-
tion, i.e. , in the absence of statutory exclusivity, the tenure policies includ-
ing the evaluation procedures were valid and legally enforceable.
Not responding to this argument, the Illinois Supreme Court in-
validated the contractual evaluation procedures as involving an illegal dele-
gation of the board's powers to appoint teachers. 155 The only authority or
rationale offered in support of this conclusion was the citation without
comment of Illinois Education Association. Hence, within two months, the
Illinois Supreme Court had ruled that evaluation procedures governing
renewal of contracts for nontenured teachers were illegal both when en-
abling legislation imposed an "exclusive" procedure for that purpose, as in
Weschlin and Illinois Education Association, and when the enabling legis-
lation imposed no procedure but empowered the board to devise such a
procedure, as in the first case in the College Teachers Trilogy.
The second case in the College Teachers Trilogy dealt with the arbitra-
bility of grievances protesting denial of promotions in rank. The Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that such grievances were inarbitrable on the basis of
the nondelegability doctrine it had asserted in Illinois Education Associa-
tion. The board's nondelegable authority to grant or deny promotions,
according to the court, was fairly implied from the provisions of the Public
Community College Act which empowered the board to employ personnel,
to establish policies governing their employment and dismissal, and to fix
154. "To establish tenure policies for the employment of teachers and administrative
personnel, and the cause for removal." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 103-32 (1975).
155. 62 II1. 2d at 476, 343 N.E.2d at 476.
156. Other jurisdictions, although agreeing with the Illinois judiciary that tenure decisions
are nondelegable, have found evaluation procedures to be severable from the ultimate decision
on tenure and have accordingly permitted arbitration of alleged violations of such procedures
and have upheld arbitral awards which granted remedies including reinstatement but not
including the granting of tenure. School Comm. of Danvers v. Tyman, - Mass. -, 360 N.E.2d
877 (1977); Dennis Yarmouth Regular School Comm. v. Dennis Teachers Ass'n, - Mass. -,
360 N.E.2d 883 (1977); School Comm. of W. Bridgewater v. West Bridgewater Teachers Ass'n,
- Mass. -, 360 N.E.2d 886 (1977). Similar recent decisions from Michigan and New York are
cited and discussed in the Tyman opinion, 360 N.E.2d at 879-80. The supportive reasoning in
these decisions comports with the rationale of the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District,
in Lockport Area Special Educ. Co-op. v. Lockport Area Special Educ. Co-op. Ass'n, 33 Ill.
App. 3d 789, 338 N.E.2d 463 (1975) discussed in text following note 150 supra. However, the
Third District stands alone in Illinois when distinguishing between the ultimate substantive
decision and preliminary procedural requirements.
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the amount of their compensation.'
57
The sole case in the College Teachers Trilogy in which the court found
in favor of the union dealt with grievances protesting that certain faculty
members had not been awarded extra work assignments consisting of the
teaching of summer school classes. The collective bargaining agreement
required that this extra work be offered to "qualified" teachers on a
rotational basis so that every faculty member would receive an equal
opportunity to perform the extra work. The arbitrator found that the board
had violated the agreement by passing over the grievants in favor of other
faculty members below them on the rotational scale, and awarded the
grievants back pay. The board sued to modify the remedy and that issue
eventually reached the supreme court. 158
In dictum, the court noted that the board had not raised, and in the
court's opinion there did not exist, any nondelegability problem because all
of the applicants for summer work admittedly were "qualified." Therefore,
unlike the result in the first two cases in the College Teachers Trilogy, these
grievances were declared arbitrable. The rationale justifying this distinction
was that "the board retains the authority to select extra courses and to offer
rotational employment only to teachers it has determined to be qualified to
teach the offered courses."
159
Thus, in the entire confused and unsteady progression from Rockford
to the College Teachers Trilogy, only one clear pattern seems to have
emerged. The Supreme Court of Illinois has declared that its chief concern is
preventing the delegation by a school board of its responsibility for deter-
mining teacher qualifications, as that determination affects such questions as
renewal of nontenured teacher contracts, awarding of tenure, and promo-
tions. This concern predominated in the Rockford and Johnson decisions of
the Illinois appellate courts. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has
devised a strange method indeed to achieve the desired end. It has refused to
enforce procedural conditions precedent to board determination of qualifica-
tions, conditions intended to guarantee due process to teachers and to assist
school boards in making substantive decisions. On the other hand, in the
157. 62 Ill. 2d at 479, 343 N.E.2d at 477.
158. The chancellor granted summary judgment to the board, ordering that the grievants be
afforded the opportunity to make up the extra work in the future in lieu of receiving back pay,
as awarded by the arbitrator. The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed, 22 I11. App. 3d
1066, 318 N.E.2d 202 (1974). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Citing both the Steelworkers
Trilogy (see text accompanying notes 64-66 supra) and earlier Illinois decisions, the court ruled
that an arbitrator was normally authorized to remedy a deprivation of work to a public
employee by a backpay award. The court further held that a make-up-of-work award would
financially prejudice the grievants because they, "in order to accept the proffered work, would
be forced to forego other work, which might be available to them." Id. at 482, 343 N.E.2d at
479.
159. Id. at 480, 343 N.E.2d at 478. (emphasis added).
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summer school case in the College Teacher Trilogy, the court has judicially
sanctioned a system whereby the board initially determined the qualified
teachers but relinquished its right to make the substantive decision on
assignments, which were instead determined by an automatic procedure.
This anomalous situation hardly squares with the court's expressed concern
for preserving the authority of school boards.
By rendering evaluation systems for nontenured teachers unenforce-
able, the court is substituting its judgment, in the absence of any clear
legislative mandate, for that of the academic community. It is not fortuitous
that so many of the decided cases involve evaluation procedure clauses
because they reflect a general consensus in academia as to how accredited
educational institutions should assure elemental fairness and due process to
faculty. To the extent that school boards, administrations and professional
educational organizations in Illinois are judicially required to deviate from
accepted standards of academic professionalism, it is most debatable
whether the status of Illinois public educational institutions will be en-
hanced. 
160
Worsening the academic debacle created by judicial intrusion into the
arena of academic due process is the fact that the courts invariably are
dealing with a fiction when they suggest that a school board actually makes
the determination whether a teacher should be hired, promoted, renewed,
transferred or given tenure. Although this assumption may be warranted in a
small school district, it is pure fancy in a large school system, where in
practice the administration makes the recommendation, which is automati-
cally rubber-stamped by the board. The irony of this fiction is manifested by
160. An Illinois appellate court decision illustrates both the inequity to the teacher and the
possible harm to the school district generated by the judicial nullification of teacher evaluation
procedures. In Board of Educ., Argo Community High School Dist. No. 217 v. Christensen, 30
I1l. App. 3d 696, 332 N.E.2d 482 (1975), a grievant had received uniformly favorable evaluations
up to and including his final probationary year prior to tenure. Yet his teaching contract was not
renewed at the conclusion of that year. He grieved, alleging a violation of the evaluation
procedure article which provided: " 'No teacher shall be refused tenure status unless the...
evaluation procedure has been substantially followed and every reasonable effort has been
made by the administration to assist the teacher to improve .... ' " Id. at 697, 332 N.E.2d at
483. At the grievance hearing before the Board the grievant contended that at no time had the
administration given him any verbal or written criticism of any kind. During his final proba-
tionary year, the North Central Accreditation Association had issued a report highly critical of
the high school and, in particular, of the department in which the grievant taught. Subsequently,
at a department faculty meeting following receipt by the grievant of the favorable evaluation
prepared by the director of his department, the grievant made proposals to the faculty members
in his department to improve the department to meet the criticisms of the accreditation
association. After the meeting, the director accused the grievant of "showing him up" and told
the grievant that his contract would not be renewed for his tenure year. No evidence or reasons
of any kind in support of the nonrenewal were submitted before the board at the grievance
hearing. The board denied the grievance and refused to arbitrate. A suit to compel arbitration
was dismissed. On appeal, the First District affirmed, stating: "Under the contract, the
evaluations are only advisory and are not binding on the Board." Id. at 698, 332 N.E.2d at 483.
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the fact that the nondelegation doctrine in Illinois was born in a case where a
school board was not allowed to delegate its responsibility to the district's
superintendent. '
6'
Thus, in the field of contract enforcement, as in the private and public
sector right-to-strike cases, the Illinois courts seem to be imposing their
philosophy about the proper power relationship of participants in the labor-
management struggle. Lacking sound judicial principles to support their
decisions, the courts are once again ignoring the Holmes-Brandeis admoni-
tion against the judiciary's performing a legislative function.
The lack of clear legal principles in this field has emasculated binding
arbitration as a means of resolving contract disputes in the public schools
because school boards are understandably unwilling to accept adverse arbi-
tration awards which in all likelihood can be successfully appealed to the
courts. Further, the Illinois courts are out of step with the judiciary of the
United States Supreme Court and of the federal district court, which have
proclaimed arbitration to be the "panacea" for the epidemic of court
congestion. 62
It is a strange and irresponsible doctrine indeed that encourages school
boards to make promises in consideration for the services to be performed
by teachers with the underlying premise that, should the boards desire to
renege, the courts will bail them out from their agreements under a non-
delegation theory. 163 The anti-labor approach of the Illinois judiciary has
resulted in a situation in which the courts have declared public employee
strikes illegal, yet also have undermined the only practical alternative of
binding arbitration. 164
161. Elder v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. 1277/2, 60 Il. App. 2d 56, 208 N.E.2d 423
(1965). See note 122 supra.
162. See Robson, Arbitration: Panacea for the Congested Court Docket? 56 CHi. BAR REC.
128 (Nov.-Dec. 1974).
163. That is not to say all provisions in collective bargaining agreements should survive
judicial attack based on the non-delegation doctrine. In Weary v. Board of Educ. School Dist.
No. 189, 46 Il1. App. 3d 182, 360 N.E.2d 1112 (1977), the Fifth District applied the doctrine, in a
two to one decision, when the agreement provided that a substantial portion of any increase in
state aid received by the board would be expended for the benefit of union members in a
manner to be designated by the union. Distinguishing the situation where the parties simply
provided for a retroactive wage increase in the event of receipt of additional funds, the court
found that under this agreement the board had delegated to the union in substantial measure its
legal responsibility. The conclusion would appear to be warranted under these facts.
164. Yet in the Johnson case, the First District gave lip service to the benefits of arbitra-
tion:
Binding arbitration of grievances, however, has much to commend it. First, the
collective bargaining agreement is more meaningful because the confidence of the
workers in the equity of the agreement is strengthened when they know that any
dispute over the meaning of the contract may be submitted to an impartial third party
for decision. Second, it encourages more careful decision making by the government
employer. If he knows that his actions may be subjected to the scrutiny of an
arbitrator whose decision will be binding, he will be less likely to make hasty
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CONCLUSION
The conduct of the Illinois judiciary in thwarting the efforts of public
employees to better themselves clearly parallels the earlier private sector
experience. Judicial action has not been based upon established legal princi-
ples, but rather upon the social, political and economic views of the judges,
masked in fictions such as criminal conspiracy, illegal purpose, universal
views and illegal delegation of powers. Legislation, either directly applica-
ble on its face or expressing legislative intent, has been overridden or
ignored by the courts.
It is also arguable that the failure of the Illinois General Assembly to
enact comprehensive public employee labor legislation is attributable in
large part to the willingness of the courts to step into the legislative vacuum,
thereby diminishing the pressure on the legislature to act. However, any
assumption that additional legislation will prove a simple panacea to resolve
public employee union problems misconceives the political process of this
country. Legislation is not a theoretically-derived solution to social issues; it
is but one result of the evolving political process and the ever-changing
social forces that contribute to that process. An illusion exists that the
judiciary operates apart from that process. This article has sought to demon-
strate that this has never been the case in the field of employer-employee
relations.
If history follows its usual tendency of repetition, the growing public
employee unions will increase in militancy, as did their counterparts in the
private sector, and if the courts do not change direction, public employee
unions will exert pressure on political officials to obtain judges more
sensitive and responsive to these workers' needs.' 65 As the federal courts
changed under the New Deal, the Illinois judiciary may be transformed in
response to the emerging strength of public employee unions.
decisions and more likely to calculate the effect of his order. Third, it would create
pressure to settle grievances at lower levels. The natural reluctance of management
officials to have 'their decisions reviewed by outside parties reduces the tendency of
upper-level management to uphold unjust decisions made by lower-level manage-
ment. Fourth, if the parties must bear the cost of arbitration by outside parties, they
are likely to attempt to resolve their differences before such expense is incurred.
2111. App. 3d at 493, 315 N.E.2d at 643-44 (quoting Agreements to Arbitrate, supra note 129, at
135-36).
165. Recent evidence suggests that the process may already have begun. In 1976, with
public employee union support, independent candidates William Clark, former Attorney Gener-
al of the state, and James Dooley, an internationally renowned trial lawyer, won unanticipated
upset victories in the Democratic primary to fill two vacancies on the Illinois Supreme Court.
Both were then elected in the general election.
